The aim of this article is to develop a theoretical framework in order to explain the access of business interests to the European Commission, the Parliament and the Council of Ministers. The degree of access to these institutions is explained in terms of a theory of demand and supply of access goods. Access goods concern information that is crucial in the EU policy-making process. In return for access to an EU institution, business interests have to supply one or more access goods. The organizational form of the interest representation determines the capacity to provide access goods. Business associative action is therefore unconventionally studied in relation with two other organizational forms: individual firm action and third party representation. To gain access, the provided access good simultaneously has to be demanded by the EU institution. Together with the supply, the EU institutions' demand for access goods is therefore carefully studied.
I. Introduction.
In the field of European interest politics many empirical studies have been undertaken during the last decade (Bennett, 1997; Greenwood et al, 1992; Mazey and Richardson, 1993; Van Schendelen, 1994) . These studies often have a case study format and a sectoral focus (Cawson, 1992; McLauglin et al., 1993; Schneider, 1992) . One of the major lessons that has been drawn from this literature is the diversity and complexity of EU lobbying which make reliable generalizations very difficult (Greenwood and Ronit, 1994) . The challenge for every researcher is however to provide general knowledge (Gorges, 1996:167) . Theory being the appropriate tool for that purpose, the aim of this paper is to develop a theoretical framework to study the interaction between business interests and the EU institutions. Although the empirical reality of the EU financial services sector has been an important source of inspiration for this paper, the aim is to propose a framework that is useful for the analysis of various sectors.
The new framework should improve our understanding of how private interests can influence the making of EU legislation in the European Union. 3 The analysis of the implementation phase is not within the scope of the framework. Since measuring influence is a rather problematic enterprise in political science, an alternative approach is taken (Huberts et al., 1994; Van Schendelen, 1998:13) . Instead of focusing on influence, as traditional lobby-research tends to do, the access of business interests to the EU institutions is studied. 4 It should be emphasized that access does not necessarily mean influence. Ineffective political actors might gain access to an institution without subsequently being able to translate this advantage into concrete, policy outcomes. Gaining access to the EU institutions is however a conditio sine qua non to exercise influence in the policy making process. Studying access is therefore likely to be a good indicator for influence (Hansen, 1991) .
The analysis focuses exclusively on legislative lobbying (Buholzer, 1998:8) . The relatively small EU budget and the characterization of the EU as regulatory state legitimize this focus (Majone, 1994; Van Schendelen, 1994:5) . 4 Studying access will greatly facilitate the operationalization of the research question. 5 Hansen (1991) investigates the evolution of interest group access to the US Congress and implicitly assumes that access equals influence.
In order to explain access of business interests to the EU institutions, an important related question is also tackled in this paper: How do private interests use different channels to lobby within the EU multi-level system? It is a traditional question in the literature and has already been addressed by many authors (Bennett, 1997 and Coen, 1997 and Eising, 2000; Kohler-Koch and Quittkat, 1999) . The answers remain however unclear because of the inapt definitions of lobby-channels and targets that are being used. 6 The proposed framework tries to go beyond the traditional pluralist -corporatist divide (Buholzer, 1998 :70, Greenwood et al. 1994 . Important characteristics of both paradigms are incorporated in the new approach. The pluralist emphasis on the plurality of groups and the importance of information is combined with the corporatist attention for resource exchange and compliance. Furthermore, the approach is different from previous research on EU lobbying in at least two other ways. First, whereas studies have mainly focused on the European Commission, in this paper also the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers are studied. The three EU institutions must be investigated simultaneously to understand the logic of interest politics at the European level. Second, the most important innovation in the approach is the decision to take organizational form as unit of analysis. The various organizational forms private interest representation can take in the European Union are chosen as the unit of analysis. Not only traditional collective action but also individual firm action and third party representation are at the heart of this investigation. This is very different from traditional interest group studies, which tend to focus on collective action in isolation from other organizational forms (Olson, 1965) .
Also the literature on European interest intermediation has mainly focused on collective action (Greenwood et al., 1992; Mazey and Richardson, 1993; Aspinwall and Greenwood, 1998) . Individual political action of firms is much less analyzed and almost never studied in relation to the collective action organized by the firms. Only a few authors have recognized the firm as an individual political actor that can decide to lobby individually and/or to undertake collectively organized political action (Grant et al., 1989; McLauglin et al., 1993; Coen, 1997) . There is however still an important third option that is largely ignored in the literature. Instead of organizing their own lobbying through individual and/or collective action, corporations can request a third party to undertake these activities for them. That is the main reason why this paper also studies the group of political consultants and lawyers specialized in the representation of business interests. Although often informally recognized to be important players in the lobbying game, remarkably few studies have dealt with third party representation of business interests (Salisbury, 1984 , Wilson, 1990 ).
More than one strategy has been followed to build the theoretical framework.
Deductive theorizing on the basis of ideas and insights from interest group theory, sociological exchange theory and resource dependence laid the foundations for the new framework. It has however been the combination and interaction of these ideas with the empirical reality of EU business interests that has been most fruitful for the development of the framework (Layder, 1998) . 7 In Brussels, the author has conducted 23 exploratory interviews with both business interests and EU officials and politicians. Moreover, a five-month internship in the European Commission in Brussels has allowed observation and even participation in the interaction between private and public interests in the EU arena. The purpose of this article is to improve our understanding of this interaction. In the next section, the theoretical foundations of the new framework are presented. These foundations allow the development of a theoretical framework to explain the access of business interests to the EU institutions in the third section. In the fourth section, a number of hypotheses will be generated on the basis of the new framework. The article concludes with a preliminary assessment of the new theory.
This happens for example when the national governments and the Council are wrongly considered to be entirely different and independent lobby targets. 7 In his Adaptive Theory Approach, Layder (1998) combines the spirit of Hypothetico-Deductive Theorizing and Grounded Theory. Whereas the former emphasizes the importance of formulating theoretical hypotheses in advance of the research in order to guide the research, the latter stresses the importance of starting the research with as little pre-formulated theory as possible in order that it may be generated during the research itself. Adaptive Theory attempts to combine an emphasis on prior theoretical ideas and models which guide research while at the same time attending to the generation of theory from the ongoing analysis of data. The "adaptive" part of the term is meant to suggest that the theory both adapts to, or is shaped by, incoming evidence at the same time as data themselves are filtered through and adapted to the extant theoretical materials that are relevant and at hand.
II. Foundations of a Theory of Access

Exchange Theory and Resource Dependence
The key to understanding the lobby activities of business interests in the European institutions is to conceive the relation between these private and public actors as an exchange relation between two groups of interdependent organizations. It would be a serious mistake to regard business lobbying as a unidirectional activity of private actors whereby the latter try to gain access to the EU institutions. Also the EU institutions are eager to interact because they need close contacts with the private sector to guarantee their optimal functioning. The two groups of organizations need each other and are therefore interested in establishing stable relationships with each other. Important insights from administrative science, organization theory and organization sociology constitute the foundations of the new theory of access.
Exchange Theory and Resource Dependence are the core of this new framework.
According to the early exchange theorists (Homans, 1958; Thibaut and Kelly, 1961; Blau, 1964) interpersonal interactions can be conceptualized as a series of exchanges.
They assumed that individuals try to maximize the utility of their interactions taking into account the costs and benefits of the interactions. In the 1960s, two Harvard sociologists developed an exchange model for the study of inter-organizational relationships (Levine and White, 1961) . They redefined the notion of exchange because the earlier definitions of exchange referred mainly to individual or psychological phenomena and were not intended to encompass interaction between organizational entities (Levine and White, 1961:587) .
Exchange theory seems to offer an interesting framework to analyze the interaction between business interests and public actors at the European level. Other authors have implicitly (Greenwood et al., 1992) or explicitly (Buholzer, 1998; Pappi et al., 1999) used exchange theories to study European interest intermediation. 8 The interaction of 8 Many authors have applied exchange theories to interest intermediation and interest group politics. The exchange paradigm is a central feature of neo-corporatism (Marin, 1990; Parri, 1989; Pizzorno, 1978; Schmitter and Streeck, 1981) . Network analysis focuses on inter-organizational exchange to private and public organizations can be conceptualized as a series of interorganizational exchanges. The organizations involved in the exchange make an implicit or explicit cost/benefit-analysis on the basis of which they decide with whom to interact. The exchange relation is however only likely to be stable and durable when the exchange is reciprocal. In that case, both sides receive benefits from the interaction. It should however be emphasized that this does not necessarily mean that the benefits of the exchange are equally distributed between the exchanging parties (Baldwin, 1978 (Baldwin, :1234 .
The previously mentioned exchange model of Levine and White (1961) is closely related with the resource dependence perspective of Pfeffer and Salancik (1978).
Whereas both theories emphasize the importance for organizations to exchange resources, resource dependency focuses more closely on the ensuing interdependence between the interacting organizations (Pfeffer, 1997:63) . According to a resource dependence perspective, organizations are not internally self-sufficient (Aldrich and Pfeffer, 1976:83) . They require resources from the environment and therefore have to interact with those organizations or groups in the environment who control the resources they need (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978:258) . A crucial consequence is that the organizations become interdependent with those organizations with which they interact. This interdependence can lead to the development of interorganizational influence attempts. Organizations can become subject to pressures from those organizations that control the resources they need.
The resource dependence perspective is helpful when studying the exchange between business interests and the EU institutions. In the context of the EU decision-making process, both private and public actors require resources from the environment and have to interact with the organizations in the environment who control the resources they need. The crucial resource required by the private actors is access to the European institutions. In return, the EU institutions demand a number of resources that are crucial for their own functioning. I call these crucial resources "access goods". These goods will be defined and analyzed in the next section.
study various forms of interest intermediation (Coleman, 1990; Laumann et al., 1987; Knoke et al., 1996; Pappi, 1995 and . In political economy or public choice, the market is the model for political exchange (Becker, 1983; McCormick and Tollison, 1981; Potters et al., 1990; Stigler, 1972) .
What are Access Goods?
To gain insight into the process of resource exchange between private and public actors at EU level, it is crucial to study the goods that are exchanged between the two groups. In return for "access" to the EU agenda-setting and policy-making process, the EU institutions want certain goods from the private actors. I call these goods "access goods". The three access goods that can be identified have a common characteristic. In the three cases, information is the basic good. Information thus becomes the most important resource to be studied in order to understand the exchange between business interests and the EU institutions. Unlike public choice approaches to interest group politics (Potters and Van Winden, 1990) , information is not treated as a rather abstract category. 9 The three access goods that are identified concern three different kinds of information and can be specified as follows: Association about the needs and interests of its members with regard to the functioning of the Belgian market for mortgage credit.
The importance of expert knowledge in the EU decision-making process has been widely acknowledged in the literature (Bowen, 1997; Buholzer, 1998 , Kohler-Koch, 1994 , Pappi et al., 1999 Radaelli, 1995 and Van Schendelen, 1994) . 10 Member
States' administrations or their permanent representations cannot provide this kind of technical market expertise. Although they have of a lot of technical know how at their disposal, they are just like the EU administration too distant from the market.
The two "encompassing access goods" have not been previously identified. 11 It is therefore necessary to study the meaning of the concept, "Encompassing Interest", in more detail. An interest is more encompassing when more parties are involved in the formulation of the interest. This means that an important aggregation of individual interests has taken place. The involved parties can be workers, firms, associations, countries, etc… A national trade association can for example be said to represent an Encompassing Interest because it is specialized in bundling the needs and interests of its member companies. Since the aggregation of interests takes place at the national sectoral level, the Domestic Encompassing Interest is concerned. It is interesting to note that the demarcation of an association's organizational domain is crucial for the encompassingness of the aggregated interest represented by the association (Schmitter and Streeck, 1999:58) . The organizational domain determines namely the variety of interests and thus the kind of members the association wants to represent.
10 Franz Pappi (1999:258) also identifies expert knowledge as a crucial resource demanded by the EU governmental actors in exchange for control of policy decisions and monitoring of information. 11 René Buholzer (1998:54) identifies legitimacy as an important "Tauschgut". An interest group should be representative enough to be recognized by the public actors as legitimate interlocutor. As discussed later in this paper, the notions of legitimacy and encompassingness are closely related. It is therefore not surprising that Buholzer's Tauschgut, legitimacy, and the two encompassing access goods Access goods are crucial for business interests to gain access to the EU institutions.
The highest degree of access is namely granted to the private actors that can provide the so-called critical resource or critical access good. The criticality of a resource for an organization is the extent to which the organization requires the resource for continued operation (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978:46-47) . The critical resources of the three EU institutions will be identified later in this paper. The criticality of an access good for an EU institution crucially determines the degree of access that institution will grant to the private actor that provides the critical good.
Definition: Access goods are goods that have to be provided by private actors to the EU institutions in order to gain access. Each access good concerns a specific kind of information that is crucial in the EU decision-making process. The criticality of an access good for the optimal functioning of an EU institution determines the degree of access the concerned institution will grant to the private interest representatives.
The three access goods are related with two crucial issues in European public policy:
legitimacy and compliance. The access goods namely play an important role in increasing the legitimacy of the EU institutions and securing a higher degree of compliance with the agreed EU legislation. Both issues are further analyzed in the next paragraphs.
Legitimacy has become a major issue for the European institutions since the SEA and the Treaty of the European Union. An important transfer has taken place of political decisions and allocations from the national to the European level. This has weakened democratic influence and control at the national level without the compensating establishment of equally strong democratic institutions and processes at the European level (Christiansen, 1997:7) . This situation has provoked discussions about the socalled democratic deficit of the European institutions and proposals for institutional reform in order to increase the legitimacy of European governance (Höreth, 1999:250) . A distinction should however be made between so-called "input" and "output" legitimacy (Höreth, 1999:250-51; Scharpf, 1999:268 Input legitimacy is related to the goods that have an "encompassing nature". The more encompassing an interest is, the more legitimate because more parties are involved in the articulation of the interest. Obtaining these access goods increases the input legitimacy of the EU institutions through the participation of these different parties in the policy process. In this discussion about input legitimacy, the issue of representativity is very important (Buholzer, 1998:55; Salisbury, 1979:222) . The representativity of an interest group is based on the density of its membership and is the basis for its recognition by the EU institutions as legitimate interlocutor. The
Representativity and Encompassingness of an interest group are positively correlated and determine the extent to which that interest group can increase the input legitimacy of the EU policy-making process through its participation therein. Output legitimacy is on the other hand closely linked to the remaining access good, Expert Knowledge.
As will be discussed later in this paper, individual large firms are good at providing expertise. Although the interaction with individual firms does not dramatically increase the overall participation in the policy process, it provides the EU institutions with the necessary expertise to deal with their problems in an efficient and effective way and thereby considerably increases output legitimacy.
resource can easily be related to the two encompassing access goods. 12 The existence of intermediary structures is considered to be an important prerequisite for democratic governance and legitimacy (Höreth, 1999:256-7) . They are indispensable in order to integrate different political, economic and social interests into the political process of a democracy. Political parties but also interests groups and social movements are important factors, which mediate between decisionmakers and citizens. The participation of these intermediary groups increases the legitimacy of the institutions in the EU decision-making process (Crouch and Menon, 1997:165) . 13 These two sources of legitimacy exist in uneasy tension. Increasing for example the participation of national and regional parliaments carries the risk of stalling decision-making in the EU. Although this move would definitely enhance the EU's democratic "input legitimacy", it would however at the same time jeopardize the legitimacy the system derives from producing effective policy outputs (Christiansen, 1997:12) .
Compliance is the second important issue to be investigated. Even though the scope of this paper is limited to the policy development and decision-making phase, it is still important to take the issue of compliance into account. Although the implementation phase is not the focus of this paper, it is very likely that private actors anticipate the problems of implementation and compliance during the earlier phases of the EU legislative process. 14 The fact that non-compliance seems to be a systemic phenomenon at the EU level is an additional reason in taking the issue of compliance into account (Mendrinou, 1996: 2).
Private interests and more precisely interest groups can play an important role when it comes to the implementation of EU legislation (Schmitter, 1979 (Schmitter, , 1981 (Schmitter, , 1982 (Schmitter, and 1983 . Two variables determine the extent to which private interest groups can become co-responsible for the compliance with the EU rules. The first variable is the capacity of interest groups to control their members. 15 Not in all interest groups do the organizational structures and decision-making mechanisms allow a high degree of control over their members (Greenwood and Webster, 2000:2) . The second important variable is the relationship between the private interest groups and the public authorities. A close, co-operative relationship can be the basis for a neo-corporatist arrangement of private interest government whereby private interest are made responsible for the implementation of legislation in a effort to reduce the authorities' implementation costs (Streeck and Schmitter, 1985) .
Only the two so-called encompassing access goods are important when the compliance issue is concerned. As explained earlier, to provide information about the EEI and/or the DEI, an aggregation or accumulation of different interests has to take place within the interest group. The extent to which the interest group can steer and control this process of interest aggregation and implementation will determine its capacity to contribute to the compliance of the private interests with agreed EU 14 Sometimes a clear distinction is made between compliance and implementation. Compliance refers to whether countries in fact adhere to the provision of an accord and the measures they have instituted.
It goes further than the notion of implementation. This notion involves only the conversion on paper of international commitments to domestic law. Compliance entails an actual change of behavior (Haas, 1998:18) . 15 Within the neo-corporatist paradigm for example, the relationship between interest groups and their members is altered. Instead of merely aggregating independently formed preferences and articulating them before the authorities, associations acquire an enhanced capacity for defining the interests of members and controlling their behavior. These organizations may even have to wield directly coercive powers to keep dissident members in line (Schmitter, 1983:48) .
legislation. The EU institutions are eager for the Information about the EEI and the DEI from interest groups because this exchange of information is likely to facilitate the implementation of the EU rules later in the legislative process.
III. A Framework to Explain Access
The three access goods that have been defined play a central role in explaining the exchange between private actors and the EU institutions. It is possible to model this exchange relation as a Supply and Demand-Scheme for Access Goods. The private actors are responsible for the supply of access goods. To gain access to the EU institutions, they need the capacity to provide one or more access goods. The private actors will however only gain access to an EU institution if the provided access good is important for the functioning of the institution. A careful analysis of the EU institutions' demand for access goods is therefore required.
[ There is only one supply of access goods. To explain variation of the dependent variable, access, both the supply and demand for access goods have to be taken into account.
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The Supply of Access Goods
The analysis of the supply of access goods proceeds in two steps. First, the mechanisms are studied that determine the firm's choice of organizational form. Once the various forms of private interest representation have been analyzed, the relationship between these organizational forms and the provision of access goods is investigated.
The Firm's Choice of Organizational Form
Firms interested in developing interest representation at European level are confronted with the following decisions:
1. Make or buy decision concerning interest representation.
2. Undertaking individual and/or collective action.
3. Undertaking action at the national and/or the EU level.
Firstly, private firms should consider whether they want to organize their political activities themselves or whether they prefer a third party to do this job. In Brussels, the third party is normally a political consultant or a law firm. Secondly, firms have to decide whether they undertake individual political action and/or become members of an association. Finally, corporations have to think about choosing the national route and/or the EU route to organize their political activities. The previous three decisions shape to a great extent the organizational form of the firms' lobby activities in the EU.
The following table presents the main organizational forms that lobby activities can take in the EU:
[ Apart from these traditional organizational forms, important new collective fora have been established during the last decade to collectively represent and promote business interests. The most remarkable development in the area of business involvement at the EU level has been the rapid growth of collective fora allowing direct participation of firms. 17 Although the new framework could also be fruitfully applied to these new organizational forms, this analysis is not possible within the scope of this paper.
Three important variables determine the firms' choice of the organizational form of their lobby activities:
1. The size of the firm 2. The economic strategy of the firm 3. The domestic institutional environment of the firm
Size is a first important variable with regard to the lobby activities of corporations.
Large firms dispose of more resources to plan and undertake political action than smaller firms. In the case of individual political action, the reasoning is obvious.
Large players have more resources to invest in individual lobbying. The cost factor becomes even more important when the multi-level structure of the European Union is taken into account. Action at the supranational level is even more resource intensive than domestic political action because of the complexity and the geographical location of EU policy-making in Brussels. Only large firms have enough resources to establish a permanent representation in Brussels and are therefore capable of developing direct lobby-strategies that include political action both at the national and at the EU level.
Smaller actors often have to rely on collective action to be able to undertake political action at different levels. Participating in collective action is less resource intensive than undertaking individual political action. That explains for example why larger firms limit their expenditures on individual lobbying during periods of economic downturn and focus more on their participation in collective action (Coen, 1996) . 17 A number of case studies have illustrated the growing importance of the direct membership association of firms in several sectors (Greenwood et al., 1994:47) . The most frequently cited examples are the Association of European Automobile Constructors (McLaughlin et al., 1993:204-208) , the EU Committee of the American Chamber of Commerce in Belgium (Cowles, 1996:340) , the European Round Table of Industrialists and the Association for the Monetary Union of Europe. The close collaboration of large firms is however not always organized on a long term or permanent basis. Apart from these formal direct membership fora, there is a sharp increase in the rather informal and ad hoc arrangements between firms. Ad hoc coalitions of large firms are established on a temporary basis to structure cooperation of firms regarding a particular issue (Pijnenburg, 1998:305) . This organizational form guarantees considerable autonomy for the coalition partners. Another new collective forum that allows for the direct participation of firms is the mixed membership association. These associations are
Interest representation by a third party can be a partial solution for the less resourceful players. It allows political representation that is tailored to the needs of the firm. The heavy financial burden of establishing a permanent representation in Brussels can be avoided. The political engagement is temporary and can be easily withdrawn if the circumstances require this. 18 These important advantages make third party representation however also an attractive instrument and a flexible additional channel for the larger and more resourceful players.
A second major factor that determines the organizational structure of a firm's lobby operations, is its economic strategy (Jacquemin et al., 1993) . Different market strategies require different political strategies. For a national niche player, the European political level seems at first sight to be of minor importance. The gradual establishment of the internal market has however substantially increased the competencies of the European authorities to regulate the different national markets. In the financial sector for example, the national legal frameworks are mainly based on transpositions of EU Directives. Being well informed about the developments at the EU level has therefore become even crucial for these local players. Via membership of their national trade association, they are mostly indirectly members of a European trade association. The latter provides them with the information that is necessary to cope with the changing legal and political environment at the EU level. For large internationally oriented firms, the EU has become a very important interlocutor. For these international players, the EU legal and political framework is crucial for the development of their international operations. The political strategies of these firms have to be tuned to their economic ambitions (Jacquemin et al., 1993:527) . They therefore often establish permanent representations in Brussels that allow them to stay in direct contact with politicians and officials at the EU level.
The domestic institutional environment of the firm is the third important variable to study in order to understand the national and transnational political activity of private interests. A closer look should be taken at the domestic institutional environments in the EU member states to identify the characteristics that affect the capacities of European level associations that include both associations and firms as members (Cram et al., 1996:454 Another crucial element to the understanding of the firm's choice of organizational form is the domestic associational structure. The absence of well-organized, strong national trade associations might oblige firms to undertake direct individual political action at the national level but also at the European level. The national associations' role within the European associations might be too weak to rely on it for the firm's political strategy at the EU level. Moreover, each domestic system of interest intermediation is characterized by a national lobby culture (Van Schendelen, 1994) .
Whereas in some countries, lobbying is encouraged and has an important and respected place in society, in other countries the concept of lobbying continues to have a rather bad reputation. A positive domestic attitude vis-à-vis lobbying is likely to encourage firms to undertake political action at the European level.
Firms that want to be politically active at the European level have to take the three previously discussed variables into account. This will enable the firm to choose an organizational form that suits its size, economic strategy and domestic institutional environment. Whereas smaller firms might be constrained to rely on only one organizational form, larger firms often have the possibility to choose a number of organizational forms (Salisbury, 1984:74 Salisbury (1984) emphasizes the importance of institutions, such as individual firms, with respect to interest representation. He argues that the profound differences in organizational form between an individual firm and a trade association have not been sufficiently studied, nor has the implication these differences have for interest group theory.
But not only the quantity and the quality of the access goods matter. Also the efficiency, i.e. speed and flexibility, of the provision of the access goods is of great importance. The following two variables have an important impact on the speed and flexibility of the provision of the access goods:
1. The number of layers (firm -national association -European association) in the organizational form 2. The complexity of the internal decision-making process of the organizational form
The more layers are involved in the provision of the access good, the slower and less flexible the access good can be supplied (Schmitter and Streeck, 1999:76) . The efficiency is also influenced by the complexity of the internal decision-making process of the organizational form. The more complicated the internal decisionmaking process, the slower and less flexible the provision of the access goods. This means that a hierarchically structured organizational form like a firm is likely to be more efficient than a decentralized, democratically organized form like an association (Salisbury, 1984:67-68) . Also here, it should be noted that for a high quantity and quality provision of certain access goods, e.g. Information on the Domestic Encompassing Interest, complicated decision-making processes are unavoidable. The 21 The vertical differentiation of an associational system determines the number of layers in the associations (Schmitter and Streeck, 1999:74) . Vertical differentiation is the extent to which an collective action undertaken in the context of national or European associations necessarily entails more or less complicated decision-making processes to establish an Encompassing Interest at the national or European level. These processes hamper however the efficient provision of the access goods.
How organizational form and the two previously discussed variables that were studied affect the provision of access goods is analyzed below in the discussion of the three main organizational forms:
1. Individual Firms (at the national or EU level):
The resource asymmetry between large and small firms explains the unequal capacities they have to provide access goods. National associations are specialized in bundling their member companies' needs and interests which allows them to represent the national sectoral interest and therefore to provide high quality Information about the Domestic Encompassing Interest. The two-layered organizational structure of the national associations and their complex decision-making structures have however a negative impact on the efficient provision of the access good. National associations have to deal with many policy issues and are therefore rather generalists than specialists or experts. It has become something of an orthodoxy throughout the EU institutions that trade association officials are "industrial civil servants" who lack the expertise needed to inform policy formulation (Greenwood and Webster, 2000:5) . Like European associations, national associations therefore tend to be not very good at providing the access good, Expert Knowledge.
Consultants (at the national or EU level):
Before studying the capacities of consultants to provide access goods, a distinction has to be made between two roles played by consultants. 29 On the one hand, consultants sometimes choose to play an advisory role or so-called back stage role.
In that case, the consultants are not directly involved in the lobby process and limit their involvement to giving advice to their clients on how to influence the EU decision-making process. On the other hand, they often play a more active role in the lobbying process or a so-called front stage role. The consultants will then not only devise a lobby strategy but also undertake the necessary activities to execute it. Only when consultants play a front stage role are they interested in the provision of access Their clients can be individual firms, national associations or European associations.
As explained earlier, each of these organizational forms has particular strengths and weaknesses with regard to the provision of the three access goods. Close collaboration between the consultants and their clients allows the former to supply the access goods that are in fact produced by the latter.
Two kinds of front stage lobbying can be distinguished. 31 In the first instance, the consultant undertakes all the lobby activities for the client. The client does not have direct contact with the target of the lobbying efforts. The consultant replaces the client in the lobby process. Depending on the client's organizational form, the consultant takes on the role of an individual firm, a national or a European association. 32 The consultant will provide the access goods that these organizational forms normally can supply. While the consultant might be able to produce Expert Knowledge, the other access goods he provides to the EU institutions are in fact produced by the client and passed on by the consultant. In the second instance, the consultant undertakes the lobby activities together with the client. contact with the lobby target. In that case, it is in fact the client who not only produces but also provides the access goods. The consultant acts as a mere facilitator.
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[ The Demand for Access Goods
How to Derive the Demand for Access Goods?
The previous analysis is however not sufficient to explain the access of private actors to the EU institutions. A careful analysis of the demand for access goods is indispensable. A number of features of the EU institutions that are likely to influence their demand for access goods are investigated. Since the objective of this paper is to understand EU legislative lobbying, there is special attention for the role of the EU institutions in the legislative process. But also other relevant features will be studied. 34 The aim is to analyze how the diverse institutional structures of the EU institutions influence their demand for access goods.
The EU institutions are to a varying extent interested in the three access goods. From a resource dependence perspective, one would say they depend on the environment for more than one resource, i.e. access good. For each EU institution, a number of dependencies can therefore be identified. Using a similar theoretical framework to Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) , Jacobs (1974) identifies the dependency that is most problematic for an organization. This so-called "most problematic dependency"
33 At the national level, a parallel analysis of front stage lobbying can be made. In the first instance, the consultant undertakes all the lobby activities for the client, i.e. the national champion or national association. In that case, the consultant will be able to provide with the support of the client the access goods that can normally be provided by the client. In the second instance, the consultant and the national champion or national association lobby together. The client produces and provides the access goods and the consultant acts as a facilitator. It should however be emphasized that the lobbying process at the national level takes place in much less complicated institutional, cultural and linguistic context. 34 It is assumed that the regulation of lobbying designed by the Commission and the Parliament has had a minimal impact so far on the patterns of interest intermediation at the European level (Bursens, 1996; Dabertrand, 1999; Hill, 1997; McLaughlin and Greenwood, 1995) . Whereas the Commission has been in favor of self-regulation of interests, the European Parliament has established some minimal rules. Most observers however agree on the limited impact of the current rules. They will therefore not be further analyzed in this paper.
concerns the resource from the environment on which the organization is most dependent and corresponds with the earlier discussed critical resource. To identify that particular dependency, Jacobs develops so-called "rankings of dependencies" of organizations (Jacobs, 1974:50) . Based on the analysis in the next paragraphs, the ranking of dependencies of each EU institution will be established and the most problematic dependency identified.
Institutional Analyses of the Commission, the Parliament and the Council.
The European Commission
The Commission is the most supranational institution of the three main institutions.
From the four images discussed by Rometsch and Wessels (1997:214) , the image of the Commission as "promotional broker" seems most appropriate. The Commission is geared to promoting common European interests, as well as promoting its own position. It is geared towards "promotional brokerage", trying to push the Member
States to accept policies that go beyond a purely intergovernmental consensus based on the lowest common denominator. To play its role as promotional broker, the Commission needs Information about the EEI. The Commission is interested in this access good because it can help to identify common European interests.
The Commission is a very small bureaucracy given its responsibilities for the development, management and control of Community policies. In 1997, the total number of permanent Commission officials and temporary staff was under 20 000 (Spence, 1997:71) . The permanent understaffing in the Commission has an important impact on the functioning of the institution. It explains why the Commission regularly hires consultants and stays in permanent contact with the private sector. 35 The understaffing makes the proper functioning of the institution dependent on external resources. In terms of the previously discussed resource dependence perspective, the understaffing makes the Commission even more dependent on those organizations that control the institution's critical resource (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978:46-47) .
The Commission has a central role in the EU legislative process. The focus in this paper on EU legislative lobbying makes a closer analysis of the Commission's crucial role in the Union's legislative process indispensable. As the analysis in this paper is confined to lobbying in the so-called first pillar of the "pillar" structure introduced by the TEU, 36 the fundamentals of the Commission's position in the legislative process can be found in Article 149 (1) and (3) of the EEC Treaty.
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The Commission's sole right of legislative initiative is based on Article 149(1) (Usher, 1997:155) . Only the Commission has the formal right to initiate legislation and is thus responsible for the drafting of legislative proposals. 38 The right of initiative has conferred upon the Commission a major role as agenda-setter at the European level. 39 The drafting of proposals takes place in the first phase of the policy-making process and requires a substantial amount of Expert Knowledge.
Often, legislation has to be developed from scratch. Particularly for these new legislative proposals, very specific expertise of the policy area is indispensable. 40 The
Commission's very strong demand for Expert Knowledge is based on this need for expertise. Given the situation of understaffing and severe budget constraints in the Commission, there is no room for hiring new specialists and only limited resources 36 In the second and third pillar, the Commission has to share the right of initiative with the Member States. 37 Article 189a (1) and (2) following the Maastricht amendments. 38 Although the Commission has the formal responsibility to initiate legislation, it is not the only institution with agenda-setting power. The Council can have recourse to Article 152 EEC, which allows it to request the Commission to "undertake any studies the Council considers desirable for the attainment of the common objectives and submit to it any appropriate proposals." The Article enables the Council to participate in agenda setting at the European level and thereby undermines the agendasetting role assigned to the Commission on the basis of its sole right of legislative initiative. Furthermore, Article 192 (ex Article 138 B) of the Treaty on the European Union puts the Parliament on equal footing with the Council (Westlake, 1997:260) . It provides that the Parliament "may, acting by a majority of its members, request the Commission to submit any appropriate proposal on matters on which it considers that a Community act is required for the purpose of implementing the Treaty". The Commission has indicated that it would respond to this new right of the Parliament as it does in the case of Council requests. A Council request always receives serious consideration but a formal proposal does not follow automatically. In that way, the Commission tries to preserve its original agenda-setting powers. 39 The Commission's right of initiative has been extended under Article 235 EEC to include even proposals on issues lying outside the scope of the Treaty (Edwards and Spence, 1997:9) . These proposals should however be justifiably intended to realize the objectives of the Community. The socalled "catch all" Article 235 has thereby allowed the European Union to move into new areas of competence.
are available for the training of personnel. The Commission is therefore dependent on external resources to obtain the necessary expertise.
Another important power of the Commission is set out in Article 149(3). It states that the Commission may alter its proposal at any time during the procedure leading to the adoption of a Community act. The Commission's power to amend proposals in practice also means that it can withdraw its proposals at any stage during the legislative procedure, which is a very powerful negative weapon. The Commission thereby effectively retains veto power during the legislative process. The
Commission's power to amend and withdraw proposals during the later phases of the legislative process does not seem to create a demand for particular access goods.
During these phases, the Commission is in discussion with the Council and the Parliament about the legislative measures. It is therefore much more interested in the input of these institutions than in the access goods that can be provided by private interests.
The Commission has also an important normative role in association with the European Court of Justice (Nugent, 1994:112) . It is the so-called guardian of the treaties and the acquis communautaire. The Commission has been entrusted by the Rome Treaty with the task of monitoring the compliance of Member States with their Treaty obligations (Mendrinou, 1996:2) . Under article 169 it has the right to undertake legal action whenever Member States do not meet their legal obligations under the Treaty (Gil Ibanez, 1998 Gil Ibanez, 1998) . 42 Infringements are failures by Member States to fulfil their Treaty obligations. They concern actions or inactions by state authorities, or by private bodies under governmental control to observe EU law provisions (Mendrinou, 1996:2) .
is therefore eager for Information about the EEI from these interest groups because this exchange of information is likely to facilitate the implementation of the EU rules later in the legislative process.
The Commission is the EU institution, which is least reconcilable with traditional democratic theory (Höreth, 1999:254) . Although the Commission has many functions comparable to a real government, it is not democratically legitimate in the same way. 43 After Maastricht, when during the difficult ratification process it became clear that the functional nature of the European project of the 1980s had left the people behind, the European Commission has sought to remedy the so-called democratic deficit and legitimacy problem. An elaborate program of greater openness, transparency and subsidiarity has been the result (Christiansen, 1997:13) . 44 In the Commission's search for legitimacy, it highly values Information about the EEI. As explained earlier in this paper, input legitimacy and access goods that have an encompassing nature are closely related. By obtaining these access goods, the institution can increase its input legitimacy. 45 The Commission is however also interested in Expert Knowledge. This access good provides the Commission with the necessary expertise to deal with policy problems in an efficient and effective way and thereby increases the output legitimacy of the institution. Whereas the Commission's search for input legitimacy is at the basis of a substantial demand for Information about the EEI, its search for output legitimacy explains the considerable demand for Expert Knowledge.
In the agenda setting and policy development phase, the Commission is not interested in Information about the DEI. At this early stage of the legislative process, the domestic private interests and the interests of most Member States concerning the issues at hand have not been identified yet. The DEI can therefore not be defined at this early stage. This is even more so if technical subject matters are concerned.
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Besides, the Commission is as promotional broker geared towards promoting 43 The control over the legislative agenda gives the Commission the power to set priorities for the Community as a whole. This kind agenda-setting power is normally reserved for elected institutions. 44 The development of a more direct Commission-public relationship was accelerated. Among other initiatives, the interaction with intermediary social groups and organizations was encouraged as an attempt to make the Commission more accountable to the European citizens. 45 Interview with Commission Official, Directorate General Internal Market and Financial Services, 5 August 1999.
common European interests. The institution is therefore not interested in Information about the DEI. On an ad hoc basis, the Commission might however be interested in this kind of information when it has for example to amend its legislative proposal to achieve a compromise in the Council and the Parliament. Information about the Domestic Interest of a particular Member State might in that case be crucial.
The European Parliament
The European Parliament provides a forum for discussions of political importance.
The institution has both supranational and intergovernmental characteristics.
Together with the European Commission, the Parliament has been a dynamic force pushing for more European integration. Although supranational political groups have been established in the Parliament over time, nationality remains a dominant cleavage within the assembly. 47 The nature of the elections for the European Parliament is an important explanation. The Parliament's roles can be grouped into three broad categories. First, the Parliament is responsible for drafting and monitoring the Community's budget. Second, it is the assembly's task to control the executive branch of the Community, i.e. the Commission and the Council (Corbett et al., 1995: 245) .
Third, the Parliament is concerned with influencing legislation.
The European Parliament's role in the Community's legislative procedure has increased from having, initially, no role whatsoever to play, to having a consultative role to powers that are more than consultative. 48 In certain areas these powers have 46 This is often the case when financial services are concerned. 47 The findings of Kreppel and Tsebelis (1999) emphasize however the importance of ideology in comparison with nationality in the European Parliament. In their article about coalition formation in the Parliament under the cooperation procedure, the authors find that generally coalitions form on the basis of ideology, not nationality. They are however also able to identify some national groups that occasionally vote against the majority of their party group. 48 The SEA introduced the co-operation procedure. This procedure added a second reading to the traditional consultation procedure. Under the co-operation procedure, the Council can overturn a rejection of the Parliament if it decides unanimously (Corbett et al., 1995:196-197) . It initially applied to only 10 Treaty articles, but these articles covered most of the legislation necessary for the completion of the internal market. The most important step forward for the European Parliament was the Treaty of the European Union. The Treaty introduced a new procedure: the co-decision procedure (Article 189B TEU). It is considered to be one the most significant constitutional changes in the Treaty. The procedure applies to most legislation, which the SEA had subjected to the co-operation procedure plus a number of new areas (Corbett et al. 1995:199) . In the Amsterdam Treaty, which came into force on 1 May 1999, the co-decision procedure was substantially simplified and the number of areas that reached the level of co-decision with the Council of Ministers (Corbett et al., 1995:220; Westlake, 1994:144) ). The Parliament's powers vary from area to area and the legislative procedures are rather complicated. It is the Parliament's task to make amendments to the proposed legislation and to take decisions.
In view of the Parliament's legislative role, its demand for Expert Knowledge is limited. This access good concerns expert information needed from the private sector to correctly understand the market and to develop good and effective legislation. At this stage of the legislative process, the Commission has already drafted the proposal.
The amount of market expertise needed to amend and to take decisions is therefore much lower in the Parliament. 49 For non-market expertise the Parliament can rely on various other sources, for example its own internal research department, Directorate
General IV for Studies (Corbett et al., 1995:182) .
The Parliament needs particularly information that allows assessing the legislative proposals made by the European Commission. 50 As directly elected supranational assembly, the Parliament tries to evaluate the proposals in a certain policy area from a Almost all the MEPs are elected in their home country. It is therefore necessary to point out that there are important differences between the national rules concerning the organization of the European elections (Westlake, 1994:79) . The EU Member
States however have electoral systems based on some kind of proportional system (Corbett et al., 1995:17) . Electoral systems have an important impact on the legislator-voter relationship (Bowler and Farell, 1993:52) . It is common wisdom that single member constituencies provide a direct link between the voter and the legislator and bring more easily local and regional concerns to the forefront. In other systems, in particular in proportional representation, this link becomes attenuated.
would be decided under co-decision was increased (New Article 251). Whereas the Council could still overturn a Parliament's rejection of legislation under the co-operation procedure, the Parliament can effectively block legislation under the co-decision procedure (Hill and Knowlton 1999:62) . This clearly illustrates the strengthening of the Parliament's powers under the co-decision procedure. State takes up the Presidency of the Council and is responsible for chairing the meetings and managing the institution's affairs during this period (Kirchner, 1992:71; Wurzel, 1996:273 (Westlake, 1995:87) . In the Council, the interests of the different Member States meet and are at the basis of intensive bargaining activities among them. Four main legislative procedures can be identified:
1) the consultation procedure provided for in the founding Treaties of Paris and Rome, 2) and 3) the assent and cooperation procedures both introduced by the Single European Act, 4) the co-decision procedure laid down in the Treaty on the European
Union. The Council can influence the final shape of the legislative proposal to varying degrees, depending on the procedure being used. 56 When it comes to decision-making in the Council, the legislative proposal has already been elaborated and the demand for Expert Knowledge from private interests has therefore substantially been reduced.
To comment or amend a proposal, a different level of expertise is required than for the actual drafting by the Commission. In the Council there is a demand particularly for information that can facilitate the negotiating and bargaining processes among the Member States.
The Council of Ministers has always played an important role in legitimating governance at the European level. The Members of the Council are directly accountable to their national parliaments and electorates. The representatives of the 55 In this paper, the focus is on the legislative role of the Council in the first pillar. In the two intergovernmental pillars, the CFSP and JHA, the Council plays a crucial and dominant role. In these pillars, the Council does not have to share its legislative powers with the European Parliament, nor are its decisions subject to interpretation by the ECJ. In the first pillar however, the Council increasingly has to share its powers with the Parliament. 56 Whereas the Council can decide almost independently about legislation under the consultation procedure, under the cooperation and the co-decision procedure, the Council has to enter into negotiations with the European Parliament over the content of its legislative acts. The Parliament is involved throughout the decision-making process. In these two procedures, the Council's powers have been restricted, the outward manifestation of which is that, under the co-decision procedure, legislation is no longer adopted in the name of the Council alone, but in the joint names of the Council and the Member States in the council are national politicians who are elected as politicians at the national level. 57 The Council's capacity to provide so-called indirect legitimacy at the EU level is however weakening (Höreth, 1999:254 
IV. Explaining Access
In order to explain access of business interests to the EU institutions the supply and the demand for access goods have to be taken into account. Private interests will only gain access to an EU institution if both the supply and demand conditions are fulfilled. Whereas private actors obviously need the capacity to supply access goods, this does not suffice. The same access goods simultaneously have to be demanded by the EU institution to which the private actors want to gain access. In this paper, the supply and demand for access goods have been carefully studied. The analysis of the supply side shows that most of the private interests can provide at least to some extent each of the three access goods. On the demand side, the EU institutions seem to a certain degree to be interested in the three access goods. Combining supply and
European Parliament (Hayes-Renshaw, 1997:197) . The Council and the Parliament have become colegislators under this procedure. 57 What this has meant in practice has varied considerably from one Member State to the other. EU policy-making is indeed only a small part of the basis on which the vote at the national level takes place. The Member States and their ministers therefore remain rather independent from their electorate and the nationally organized interests.
demand would then generate the unsatisfactory and uninteresting hypothesis that most private actors have to a certain degree access to the three EU institutions. Insights from Resource Dependency Theory allow us however to generate more specific and interesting hypotheses.
According to Pfeffer (1982) , identifying an EU institution's most problematic dependency or critical resource allows one to find out to which private actors that institution will grant the highest degree of access. He argues namely that organizations will respond more to the demand of the group or organization in the environment that controls the most problematic dependency (Pfeffer, 1982:193) . In terms of the European institutions this means that an EU institution will respond more to the demand of a private interest, i.e. will give more access to a private interest, that controls the institution's most problematic dependency or critical resource. The private actors who can provide the highest quantity and quality of the critical access good in the most efficient way will therefore enjoy the highest degree of access to the 2. European associations have less access to the European Commission than large individual firms do, but better access than the national associations.
3. National associations have the worst access to the European Commission.
European Parliament:
1. European associations have the highest degree of access to the European Parliament.
2. National associations (and national champions) have less access to the European Parliament than European associations do, but better access than large individual firms.
3. Large individual firms have the worst access to the European Parliament.
Council of Ministers:
1. National associations (and national champions) have the highest degree of access to the Council of Ministers.
2. European associations have less access to the Council of Ministers than national associations do, but better access than large individual firms.
3. Large individual firms have the worst access to the Council of Ministers.
Some of these hypotheses are more compelling than others. On the basis of the same logic of access, it is also possible to generate a number of interesting additional hypotheses. I call them intra-institutional hypotheses because they concern the access of private interests to different intra-institutional targets. While keeping the same supply of access goods, the three EU institutions are de-composed in different parts and thoroughly analyzed to derive the intra-institutional demand for access goods. 58 The combination of the old supply and the new demand allows us to generate a number of intra-institutional hypotheses. Further analysis of these hypotheses is however not possible within the scope of this paper.
V. Conclusion
The extent to which the new theory contributes to general interest group theory is an important element in assessing the new framework. It seems that the theory of access might provide new insights into processes of group formation. To improve our understanding of interest group formation, it might be useful to study the capacity of interest groups and other organizational forms to provide access goods. I argue that as well traditional forms of collective action as the new collective fora discussed earlier in this paper have been established because they allow private interests to provide new and/or better access goods and to provide them in a more efficient way. Interest groups and other organizational forms give private interests the possibility to collaborate to provide access goods. Private interests are prepared to cooperate when it is impossible for them to provide the access good individually. Collaboration becomes indispensable to guarantee the joint provision of the access good. 59 The second reason for collaboration is the accumulation of access goods. In that case, each of the private actors is able to provide a certain access good individually but is ready to collaborate to combine the capacities of the two parties to provide access goods.
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When actors collaborate, they can increase their capacity to gain access to the
EU institutions.
A second criterion to assess the new theoretical framework is its applicability. The new insights are supposed to be useful to analyze legislative lobbying of most business interests in the EU because the aim has been to build a framework that would apply to different sectors. It might also be possible to adapt the framework to the national level. Instead of an in-depth analysis of the EU institutions, the specific national institutional setting should then be taken into account. One could finally wonder whether the basic insights of the framework might also be applicable to non- 58 The Council of Ministers is for example de-composed in the Secretariat, the Presidency and the different Member States. On the basis of a thorough analysis of these different parts, the intrainstitutional demand for access goods can be derived. 59 Direct membership associations of firms are a good example. Whereas it is impossible for large firms to provide individually the access good, Information about the EEI, the collaboration of large firms in direct membership associations allows to a certain extent the joint provision of this access good.
business interests (Pollack, 1997) or non-legislative lobbying (Buholzer, 1998:8) .
Ultimately, the only way to judge the applicability of the proposed framework is the confrontation with the empirical reality. The supply and demand for access goods, the hypotheses about access to the EU institutions and the concept of access good itself have to be systematically and empirically studied. The earlier decision to focus on access instead of influence should greatly facilitate the operationalization of the framework. Existing empirical studies can also contribute to the testing of the theoretical framework (Bennett, 1997; Bowler and Farrell, 1993; Kohler-Koch et al., 1999 , Pappi et al., 1999 , Salisbury, 1984 . The data gathered in these studies is often only partially useful to verify the hypotheses. It is promising that Coen and Héritier 
